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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
16548

-vsTHOMAS WYHAN BERG,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEHENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with distribution of a
controlled substance, marijuana, wherein nothing of value
is exchanged in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)A(c)
(1953), as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before the court, having
waived a jury trial, and found guilty of one count of
distribution of a controlled substance on May 25, 1979,
in the Fourth Judicial District, in and for Utah County,
State of Utah, the Honorable George E. Balli£, presiding.
On June 29, 1979, appellant was sentenced to a prison term
not in excess of five years at the Utah State Prison and
a :!:ine of $1,500.

The prison term was suspended and
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appellant was placed on probation after serving a six
month sentence in the Utah County Jail as a condition
of probation.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the verdict
and judgments of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 20, 1978, Craig Wiseman contacted
Jill Hales about the possibility of Ms. Hales obtaining
"a pound" of marijuana for him (Tr.S4,12-13).

Ms.

Hales agreed to procure the marijuana for Wiseman (Tr.
12-13).

The next day, November 21, 1978, appellant

telephoned Ms. Hales and inquired whether she and Teri
Barney, Ms. Hale's friend, "wanted to drop down for a
cup of coffee"

(Tr .14, 24).

Ms. Hales then told appellant

that a friend of hers had asked her to get "some stuff"
and she"asked him [appellant] if he could maybe find
[her] something."

(Tr.l4).

Appellant answered that "he

would try" and Hs. Hales said she "would see him at
coffee"

(Tr.l4).
Later that day (November 21, 1978), at about

10:00 a.m., Ms. Hales and Ms. Barney drove to see
(Tr .15).

appell~

When they arrived, Hs. Hales and appellant went
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to the living room, out of the presence of Ms. Barney
(Tr.lS).

At that time, appellant presented Ms. Hales

with the marijuana and said, "I have got this for
you"

(Tr.l6).

Ms. Hales thanked

marijuana and "told him •

appellant for the

[she] would bring the

money to him later;" appellant responded "Okay" (Tr.l7).
Ms. Hales and Ms. Barney then drove to the
Golden Spike Restaurant to deliver the marijuana to
Mr. Wiseman which "was what [she] had planned • •
night before • .
(Emphasis added.)

• [with] Craig Wiseman"

the

(Tr .18) •

At the restaurant, Ms. Barney (who

was driving) parked the car in the parking lot (Tr.l9).
Ms. Hales removed the marijuana from her purse (Tr.l9,
46).

At this point, Ms. Barney saw the marijuana for the

first time (Tr.l9,27-28).

The marijuana was wrapped in

a white windbreaker and placed in Wiseman's car (Tr.29,
48) by Ms. Hales.

The two women drove "to the front of

the Spike" and Hs. Hales went inside to find Wiseman
(Tr.48).

Ms. Hales spoke with Wiseman "for a minute"

and returned alone to the car (Tr .19).

~viseman

soon

came out to the car and handed Hs. Hales "a wad" of
money (Tr.l9), determined to be $450 (Tr.55).
As the two women began to drive from the
restaurant, a police car pulled up behind them (Tr.l9).
Ms. Hales hid the money under the floor mat of the car
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(Tr.l9-20).

The police officers arrested Ms. Hales

(Tr.20) and Wiseman as he was driving from the scene
(Tr •.56).

Teri Barney was not arrested (Tr. 29).
Ms. Hales was read her rights and taken to

police headquarters and questioned (Tr.21-22).

During

the conversation, the police learned that Ms. Hales
was in the process of getting a divorce and she "was
having problems [with a]

. custody matter"

regarding her child (Tr.38).

The police, therefore,

offered to forego charging her with involvement in the
drug transaction (since the prosecution would be detrimental in her child custody matter, in exchange for her
acting as an informant against appellant (Tr.21-23).

Ms.

Hales was wired with a listening device and returned to
appellant's home (Tr.22).

Ms. Hales was vague about the

conversation she had with appellant upon returning, but
she testified that appellant asked her if she was in
trouble; she asked him if he had "any more stuff," to whic'
appellant replied "maybe a little;" and appellant asked
whether or not "they got it" (no explanation was given
as to whom "they" referred or what "it" was)

.(Tr.22-23).

(Judge Ballif's memorandum decision notes that this
phrase meant "whether or not the cops got the 'stuff.'"
(R.

22)).
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On the basis of Ms. Hales' information

about

her receipt of marijuana from appellant on the morning
of November 21, 1978, a complaint and a search warrant
was sworn out before Judge J. Gordon Knudsen on November
21, 1978.

An information later charged appellant with

distributing a controlled substance to Ms. Hales wherein
nothing o"f value was exchanged (R.2,3-4,ll).
The crime of which appellant was convicted was
distribution of a controlled substance to Ms. Hales
wherein nothing of value was exchanged.
bution

This

distri-

occurred when appellant gave Ms. Hales the pound

of marijuana on the morning of November 21, 1978.

(R.2,ll).

Although another drug transaction occurred between
Ms. Hales and Mr. Wiseman

at the Golden Spike Restaurant

that offense is not at issue in this case.
On May 24, 1979, appellant waived his right to
a jury trial

(Tr.3-5) and had his case tried before the

Honorable George E. Ballif.

The trial concluded on the

same day and Judge Ballif's decision was delivered on
May 25, 1979

(R.21-23).

After outlining the facts, Judge

Ballif ruled that:
On the basis of the aforesaid
facts . . . Jill Hales was not an
accomplice in that her receipt of
[the marijuana] :rom the defendant
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constituted the offense of possession
of a Schedule I controlled substance,
and not the transfer for value or
otherwise of the same which the defendant is on trial for in this proceeding.
(R.22, emphasis added.)
Judge Balli£ concluded that Ms. Hales' testimony
did "not have to be corroborated by any other evidence"
in order to convict appellant of the crime charged.

(R. 22).

The Court cited the cases of State v. Kasia, 27
Utah 2d 326, 495 P.2d 1265 (1972) and State v. Cornish,
560 P.2d 1134 (Utah 1977) as the controlling cases.
In his decision, Judge Balli£ called "counsel's
attention

to House Bill 143" which amends

§

77-31-18

(1953, as amended) and provides that a conviction may be
obtained on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
Appellant now appeals that conviction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE STATE'S
KEY WITNESS, JILL HALES, \'lAS
NOT APPELLANT'S ACCOMPLICE.

The major thrust of appellant's appeal

(and,

indeed, the entire basis of the Amicus Curiae brief filed
in conjunction with this case) is that Judge Ballif im-
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properly applied the new accomplice statute, Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-31-18

(1979), to the present matter.

Yet, this basic

premise ignores the fundamental finding of Judge Ballif .
that Jill Hales was not appellant's accomplice and her
testimony alone, could therefore convict appellant.
Because of this conclusion, the new accomplice statute
was not relied on in admitting the testimony of Jill Hales.
Ms. Hales' testimony is a complete and inculpatory indictment against appellant and was sufficient to convict
appellant of the crime charged.

Since Judge Ballif ruled

Hs. Hales was not an accomplice the possible retroactive
application of the new accomplice statute is not at issue.
Respondent submitts that Judge Ballif's decision (R.21-23)
that Ms. Hales was not an accomplice is a logical, accurate
ruling.

In dicta, Judge Ballif called attention to the

fact that a new trend in the area of criminal accomplice
law is developing as evidenced by the Utah Legislature's
enactment of the new accomplice statute.

Clearly, if

Judge Ballif had relied on the new accomplice statute
in his decision it would have been inconsistant and unnecessary
to rule that Ms. Hales was not appellant's accomplice.
Respondent submits that the decision that Ms. Hales was
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not appellant's accomplice was sound and justified.

Utah

Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1953), as amended, outlines the
requirements one must meet to be an accomplice to a
crime:
Every person acting with the
mental state required for the commission of an offense who directly
commits the offense, who solicits,
requests, commands, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person
to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally
liable as a party for such conduct.
Here, while Ms. Hales did encourage appellant to
procure the marijuana for her, she did not "engage in
conduct which constitut[ed]" the same offense for which
appellant is charged in the instant matter

(distribution

of a controlled substance not for value) . "Conduct which
constitutes" the same offense is necessary in order for
a participant in a crime to be deemed an accomplice.
State v. Davie, 121 Utah 184, 240 P.2d 263

(1952) this

requirement was clearly established:
We have construed the term
[accomplice] to mean one who could
be charged as a principal with the
defendant on trial.
State v. Fertig,
Utah, 233 P.2d 347; State v. Bowman,
92 Utah 540, 79 P.2d 458, 111 A.L.R.
1393. This definition is generally
recognized to be correct, see 22
C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 786, p. 1335;
14 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, § 110.
240 P.2d at 263-264.
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In

To illustrate this point, respondent offers the
following example:

The principal in a "fencing" oper-

ation who seeks and buys stolen goods from thieves and
burglars could not be said to be an accomplice with

the~

in the numerous, isolated thefts or burglaries which the
"suppliers" have committed.

The operator's crime is the

narrow offense of receiving, possessing and re-selling
stolen pro"perty.

The "suppliers'" crimes are those of

theft, burglary or robbery.

However, if the fencing

operator actively participated with the thieves and burglars
in the commission of the thefts, burglaries or robberies,
then he would obviously be an accomplice.
Recently, this court has expanded the Davie
definition of accomplice to include those actors who
" . . . knowingly, voluntarily, and with common intent
with the principal offender,

[unite] in the commission

of a crime, so that he could also be charged with the
same offense."

State v. Georgopoulos, 27 Utah 2d 53,

492 P.2d 1353, 1354 (1972).
563 P.2d 794, 797

In accord, State v. Helm,

(Utah 1977).

Thus, in applying this additional requirement
of "common intent" to the hypothetical above, comparison
wi~h

the present case is apparent.

The fencing operator

could not be an accomplice with the thieves and burglars
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because he did not have the requisite intent to commit
theft, burglary or robbery--even though it could be said
that he encouraged and even solicted crime.

Likewise in

the present case, Ms. Hales cannot be said to be an
accomplice with appellant because she did not have the
requisite intent to distribute marijuana not for value
at the moment the drug was given to her from appellant.
She only had intent to receive the marijuana.
Probably because of this very rationale this
Court, in State v. Kasai, supra, ruled that "[t)he

I
infra.) I

purchaser of narcotics is not an accomplice of the seller."
495 P. 2d at 1266.

(See further discussion of Kasai,

Section § 76-2-202, Utah Code Annotated (1953),
as amended,

(above quoted) has been relied upon in support

of the proposition that such intent, as required by
is necessary in order for a participant to be found to
be an accomplice.

In State v. Cornish, supra, the Court,

after quoting § 76-2~202, stated:
Under that statute and under the
generally accepted meaning of the term,
an "accomplice" is one who participates
in a crime in such a way that he could
be charged and tried for the same offense.
From that definition, it will be seen that
it does not include a person who, without
using inducement or persuasion which
would amount to entrapment, merely provides
an opportunity for one who is disposed to
conunit a crime. More specifically
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
-10- by the Utah State Library.
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I

applicable here, a person so acting
under the direction of a peace officer
in attempting to discover violations
of law, is not an accomplice.
560 P.2d at 1136.

In accord, State v. Kasai, supra.

Thus, in the instant case, since appellant's
offense was distribution of a controlled substance to
Ms. Hales,_ she could not have also been charged with
distribution of a controlled substance wherein nothing
of value is exchanged.

She therefore cannot be found to

be appellant's accomplice.

Ms. Hales did not partici-

pate as a distributor of the controlled substance in the
narrow transaction at issue here.

Rather, she was the

recipient of the controlled substance.

Although this

Court has retreated somewhat from this test of whether
a participant could have been charged with the same offense
as a basis of determining whether an accomplice status
exists

1

(see State v. Foust, 588 P.2d 170 (Utah 1978))

1

,

Resoondent notes further that the Foust case is an
ext'i:-eme case.
The Court \vas there faced with determining whether appellant's 16 year old stepdaughter
could be said to be his acconplice in the crime of
incest.
The Court ruled she was or could be an
accomplice.
Respondent suggests this case is an
anamoly and is not in accord with the thrust of
the other Utah cases on the subject of accomplice
la~, as cited herein.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-11-OCR, may contain errors.
Machine-generated

it remains a useful starting point for an inquiry into
a participant's connection with the crime.
In making such an inquiry, an important ruling
by this Court in State v. Kasai, supra, is relevant.
Kasai holds:
The purchaser of narcotics is
not an accomplice of the seller, as
the offense of the purchaser is
"possession" and not "selling"; and,
therefore, the conviction of a defendant may be founded on the purchaser's
uncorroborated testimony.
495 P.2d at 1266.
The analogy is easily made between the "purchaser"
in Kasai and Ms. Hales -- a non-purchasing recipient -- in
the instant case.

And since Ms. Hales received the mari-

juana from appellant, she too can only be deemed to have
been in possession of the drug.

Thus, as Kasai holds,

she cannot be found to be appellant's accomplice in the
offense for which appellant was charged.

In a similar

rultng, the Court in State v. Washington, 25 Utah 2d 111,
476 P.2d 1019

(1970) rejected an appellant's claim that

certain witnesses to a crime for which he was convicted
were actually his accomplices.
In Washington, the defendant was convicted of
receiving stolen property.

Three other holders and

possess-~
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I
0' I

of the stolen property testified at trial about the
defendant's connection with the stolen goods.

To defendant's

contention that these three witnesses were his accomplices,
the Court responded:
While these witnesses may have
been ~uilty of similar offenses, the
record fails to reveal that they in
any way participated with the de·fendant in the crime here charged
against him.
476 P.2d at 1021.
The same rationale is applicable in the present
case.

Merely because Ms. Hales "may have been guilty of

similar offenses "of which appellant was herein convicted
(i.e., possession or distribution to Mr. Wiseman), such a
fact, can not, without more, automatically result in her
being deemed appellant's accomplice.

Rather, Washington

requires that appellant must do more than assert that
Ms. Hales may have committed similar crimes in order for
her participation in the crime charged to appellant to
reach an accomplice level; i.e., he must show that she
''participated with the defendant in the crime charged."
Id., emphasis added.
Scrutiny of the facts shows that Ms. Hales'
participation did not reach such a level.

Appellant's
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attorney, on cross examination of

~is.

Hales, elicited

the following:

Tr. 25-26

Q.

And Craig Wiseman took the initiative to call you on the 20th?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And Mr. Befg [sic) was not aware
of that phone call in the sense
that he was not present and was
not aware of when it was made?

A.

No.

Q.

And he did not authorize you to
talk with Mr. Wiseman in any way?

A.

No.

Q.

This was your deal and Mr. Wiseman's
deal, in a sense, and it ·was a conversation between the two of you?

A.

Right.

(Emphasis added.)

Thus, Ms. Hales' planning, solicitation, encouragement
and intent to commit a crime was not with appellant, but
was with Mr. Wiseman.

Thus, Ms. Hales' major participation

in this entire series of drug transactions, is with Mr.
l~iseman,

and not with appellant.

As to the specific crime

at issue here, Ms. Hales acted only as a receiving agent or
condiut for Mr. Wiseman, without appellant's knowledge
prearranged plan.

oft~

Thus, under the Davie, Kasai and 1\lashingtc:,
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tests, she cannot be an accomplice of appellant even though
she may have engaged in similar drug-related conduct.

Her

intent was not to distribute marijuana not for value.

Tpis

conclusion is further supported by two Utah Supreme Court
cases:

State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 662 (1972)

and State v. Helm, supra.
In Gee, the appellant argued that two witnesses
to his acts of child abuse (which led to the child's death)
were in fact his accomplices.

This Court disagreed and

ruled:
Defendant's assertion is without
merit. The baby died of head injuries;
there is not a scintilla of evidence to
indicate the witnesses advised, instigated,
encouraged or assisted defendant in the
perpetration of this crime. Futhermore,
mere presence combined with knowledge
that a crime is about to be committed,
where the person contributes nothing to
the doing of the act, will not itself
constitute one an accomplice.
498 P.2d at 665 (Emphasis added.)
In Helm, the appellant made a similar argument.
He claimed that two witnesses, junior officers in
the Highway Patrol, who were present at the scene of a
crime he was convicted of were actually his accomplices.
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I.

In rejecting the claim, this Court held:
To establish that predicate, it
would have to appear that the officers knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally united with the defendant and aided, abetted, or encouraged in the commission of the crime.
Moreover, the mere presence where a
crime is being committed, or about
to be committed, without such an
intent to join therein, being shown,
is not sufficient to find that one
is an accomplice.
563 P.2d at 797.
Ms. Hales' actions in the instant case similarly,
do not support a claim that she was appellant's accomplice.
Merely because whe was present at the scene of the crime
and had knowledge that a criminal act was about to be
committed is not sufficient to find that she was an
accomplice.

Furthermore, as Helm establishes, where it

appears that Ms. Hales did not unite with appellant in
the commission of the specific crime appellant is charged
with, then the accomplice claim of appellant must be rejected.
Respondent submits that a careful review of the
facts in this matter coupled with an application of the
relevant case law show that Judge Balli£ correctly ruled
that Ms. Hales was not and can not be deemed appellant's
accomplice in the narrow crime under review.
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POINT II
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO,
THAT JILL HALES WAS APPELLANT'S ACCOMPLICE, SUFFICIENT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE,
WHICH CONNECTED APPELLANT
WITH THE COMMISSION OF THE
CRIME, WAS PRESENTED AT
TRIAL TO SATISFY THE ACCOMPLICE STATUTE'S REQUIREMENT
OF CORROBORATION.
Respondent again asserts the fact that Judge
Ballif determined that Ms. Hales was not an accomplice in
the crime at issue here and that consequently corroboration

is not relevant.

But inasmuch as appellant has claimed

that insufficient corroboration evidence was presented at
trial and should this Court rule that Ms. Hales was an
accomplice,this Point is necessary.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18
(pre -

(1953) as amended,

May 8, 1979) provided:
A conviction shall not be had
on the testimony of an accomplice,
unless he is corroborated by other
evidence, which in itself and without the aid of the testimony of the
accomnlice tends to connect the
defendant with the commission of the
offense; and the corroboration shall
not be sufficient, if it merely
shows the commission of the offense
or the circumstances thereof.
Thus, if Ms. Hales were an accomplice, corroboration
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of her testimony must be presented before a conviction
of appellant can be sustained.

At trial, two witnesses

in addition to Ms. Hales testified concerning the events
of November 20 and 21, 1978:

Teri Barney and Craig Wisemqn,

Ms. Barney testified concerning her visit with Ms. Hales
to appellant's home on November 21, 1978, and the subsequent
activities at the Golden Spike Restaurant (Tr.43-49). Mr.
Wiseman testified regarding his request of Ms. Hales on
November 20, 1978, to procure marijuana for him and the
manner in which the drug was later delivered and payment
made.

(Tr.52-58).

Respondent contends that even if Ms.

Hales' role in this crime can be constru.ed as that of an
accomplice, these two witnesses sufficiently support her
testimony to satisfy the statutory and case law requirements
of corroboration.
The landmark corroboration case in Utah is
State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285
the Utah Court interpreted

§

105-32-18,

(1941).

Here

(Rev. St. 1933) --

an identical corroboration statute to the one above quoted
and held:
. . . corroboration need not go
to all the material facts testified
to by the accomplice.
[Citation
omitted); that the corroborative evidence
need not be sufficient in itself to
support a conviction; it may be
slight and entitled to little consideration. [Citations omitted).
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On the other hand, the corroborating evidence must implicate the defendant in the offense and be consistent
with his guilt and inconsistent with
his innocence, and must do more than
cast a grave suspicion on him, and
all of this must be without the aid
of the testimony of the accomplice.
[Citations omitted].
120 P.2d at 299.
The Court further defined the standards for corroborative
testimony by holding that:
In order to sustain a conviction,
the evidence . . . must be of such
persuasive force that the mind might
be reasonably satisfied of all the
necessary facts constituting the
defendant's guilt beyond any reasonable doubt; and where the proof of a
necessary fact is dependent solely
upon circumstantial evidence, such
circumstances must be such as to
reasonably exclude every reasonable
hypothesis other than the existence
of such fact and be consistent with
its non-existence.
It is not necessary that each circumstance in
itself establish the guilt of the
defendant, but the whole chain of
circumstances, taken together, must
produce the required proof.
120 P.2d at 302.
In accord, State v. Bruner, 106 Ctah 49, 145 P.2d 302 (1944),
State v. Vigil, 123 Utah 495, 260 P.2d 539

(1953), and State

\'.Baron, 25 Utah 2d 16, 474 P.2d 728 (1970).
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Applying these standards to the present case,
the testimony of Ms. Barney and Mr. Wiseman satisfy the
outlin.ed requirements.

Even if their testimony can be

considered as not "[going] to all the material facts
testified to by" Ms. Hales, would not "be sufficient in
itself to support a conviction" and both are "slight and
entitled to little consideration," the testimonies are,
nonetheless, adequate as corroborative evidence.

Erwin

holds that such evidence, while perhaps insufficient by
itself to convict, meets the test of sufficiency for
corroborative evidence purposes.

That is, the testimony

is sufficient i f it "irnplicate[s] the defendant," is
"consistent with his guilt" and "do[es] more than cast
a grave suspicion on him."

Respondent contends that these

requirements have been met here.

Ms. Barney's testimony

placing Ms. Hales in appellant's horne on the day in
question, supported Ms. Hales testimony regarding the
distribution of the marijuana to Mr. Wiseman and thereby
implicated appellant in the instant offense.

Mr. Wiseman

verified Ms. Hales' testimony as to his initiating the
procurement of the marijuana and substantiated the evidence
as to the method of distributing the drug as Ms. Hales
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testified.

This linking corroboration satisfies the statute

and the case law.
These requirements outlined in Erwin were stated

---

.

in a similar manner in State v. Clark, 3 Utah 2d 382, 284
P.2d700

(1955):

* * * It has been uniformly held
that the test of the sufficiency of
·the corroborating evidence is that it
need not be sufficient in itself to
sustain a conviction, but it must in
and of itself tend to implicate and
connect the accused with the commission of the crime charged, and not
be consistent with his innocence.
284 P.2d at 701, quoting State v. Cragun, 85 Utah 149,
158, 38 P.2d 1071, 1075

(1934).

Clark, therfore, holds

that the generally accepted rule of corroboration is that
it need not be independently adequate to convict a defendant, but it must tend to implicate him with the crime and
not be consistent with his innocence.

Such requirements

are satisfied here.
In State v. Sinclair, 15 Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d
465

(1964), this court was faced with evaluating the

sufficiency of certain corroborative evidence in a murder
case.

After discussing the facts of the case and analyzing

the testimony given, the Court stated:
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It may well be that certain of
the foregoing facets of the evidence,
considered separately, could be regarded as not inculpatory and thus be
vulnerable to defendant's charge that
it does not connect her with the crime.
But that is neither the sensible nor
the practical approach to the problem.
Nor does the law require that the separate bits of evidence be viewed in
isolation. A great many crimes are
planned to be committed by stealth and
in secret, as this one was.
It is
necessary and proper to take whatever
fragments of proof can be found and
piece them together in conjunction with
the reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom in order to fill in the whole
mosaic of the crime. We are cognizant
that our statute uses the language
"without the aid of the testimony of
the accomplice" and that it has been
said that the corroborative evidence
should be looked at separate and apart
from his testimony.
That is true to
determine whether there is some independent evidence which tends to connect
the defendant with the crime.
But it is
also true that the evidence can only
have relevancy to the crime as it relates
to the circumstances surrounding it.
389 P.2d at 469

(emphasis in original).

This broadened construction of sufficient
corroborative evidence was then illustrated with a hypothetical:
Conceding the wisdom and propriety of being wary of the testimony of an accomplice, and of not
permitting a conviction to rest solely
upon it, nevertheless, reason dictates
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that the practical exigencies of a
situation may well require that all
of the circumstances be viewed together in order to determine the
facts.
For example: witnesses see
X coming from the woods. He has a
knife and is smeared with blood.
Considered alone, this could well
be innocent. He may have killed a
deer.
But the body of a man, recently
killed by stabbing, is found nearby.
An accomplice to the murder states
·that he and X did it.
It is obvious
that the observations that were made
of X near the time and place of the
murder, considered in the light of
the later-discovered facts, take on
a different significance and could
reasonably be regarded as tending
to connect X with the crime. The
same reasoning applies to the instant
case. The corroborative evidence
should be considered in relation to
the other facts shown. When this is
done it seems undoubted that it could
be accepted by reasonable minds as
evidence of substance and probative
value tending to connect the defendant
with this crime. This satisfies the
requirement of the law.
389 P.2d at 469.

In accord, State v. Kitchen, 564 P.2d 760,

762 (Utah 1977).
The same logic is applicable in the case at bar.
i~hile

Hs. Barney's and Hr. lhseman' s testimonies viewed

in isolation could be considered deficient for conviction,
when ''the whole mosaic of the crime" is analysed, the testimonies effectively and adequately corroborate Hs. Hales'
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testimony.

Furthermore, when the evidence is "considered

in relation to the other facts shown," reasonable minds
can de'termine that the testimonies of Ms. Barney and Mr.
Wiseman probatively connect appellant to the crime.

While

Ms. Barney may have only seen the circumstantial events on
November 21, 1978 and Mr. Wiseman the end product of his
request of Ms. Hales, taken together the two witnesses'
testimonies meet the requirements for corroboration.
State v. Christean, 533 P.2d 872

(Utah 1975),

re-states this Sinclair rule:

. . . it may well be that certain facets of the evidence, considered separately, could be regarded
as not inculpatory and thus be
vulnerable to the accused's claim
that it does not connect him with
the crime. However, the law does
not require that the separate bits
of evidence be viewed in isolation,
for it is proper to take whatever
fragments of proof that can be
found and piece them together with
the reasonable inferences to be
drawn therefrom in order to fill
in the whole mosaic of the crime.
Although a conviction may not rest
solely upon the testimony of an
accomplice, all of the circumstances
may be viewed together to determine
the facts.
The corroborative evidence should be considered in relation
to the other facts appearing in the
evidence of record.
If, in utilizing
this process, it can be accepted by
reasonable minds, as evidence of
substance and probative value tending
to connect the defendant with the
crime, the requirements of the law
are fulfilled.
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Respondent submits that in viewing the corroborative evidence in relation to the other facts appearing
in the record, reasonable minds can properly accept the
evidence as substantive and probative in value, tending
to connect appellant to the crime.

Thus, the requirements

of the accomplice corroboration law are fulfilled.
Furthermore, respondent claims that the tests outlined
in State v. Erwin, supra, are satisfied in this case and
that therefore, if, arguendo, Ms. Hales was appellant's
accomplice, sufficient corroborative evidence was presented
to support Ms. Hales' testimony and, in addition, Judge
Ballif's determination of

appellant's guilt.

POINT III
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO,
THAT JILL HALES WAS APPELLk~T'S ACCOMPLICE AND
THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID
APPLY THE NEW ACCOMPLICE
STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-31-18, SUCH APPLICATION WAS PROPER.
As noted above, respondent contends that Jill
Hales was not an accomplice in this matter and that
consequently, there is no need to discuss any accomplice
statute.

Yet, since this Court has permitted an Amicus

Curiae brief to be filed, respondent will answer the legal
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issues raised therein.

The Amicus brief deals entirely

with the constitutional issue of application of ex post
facto 'laws; the primary brief's major emphasis also focuses
on this issue.
This issue centers on the disparate requirements
of the two Utah accomplice statutes which were both in
effect at various times throughout the crime's commission
and the trial.
Ann.

The earlier statute,

§

77-31-18, Utah Code

(1953) as amended, provided:
Conviction on testimony of accomplice.
- A conviction shall not be had on the
testimony of an accomplice, unless he
is corroborated by other evidence,
which in itself and without the aid of
the testimony of the accomplice tends
to connect the defendant with the cornmission of the offense; and the corroboration shall not be sufficient, if it
merely shows the commission of the
offense or the circumstances thereof.
The statute,

§

77-31-18, as enacted by the Utah

Legislature, effective May 8, 1979, now provides:
Conviction on uncorroborated testimony
of accomplice-cautionary instruction.-(1)
A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
(2)
In the discretion of the court, an
instruction to the jury may be given to
the effect that such uncorroborated
testimony should be viewed with caution,
and such an instruction should be given
if the trial judge finds the testimony
of the accomplice to be self contradictory,
uncertain, or improbable.
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It is undisputed that the offense at issue here
was committed while the earlier statute was in effect and,
therefore, it is the controlling law, in most circumstances.
Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall.

(U.S.)

386 1 L. Ed. 648,

(1798).

Respondent submits, however, that an exception to the
general rule is applicable here inasmuch as changes in
statutory requirements that are procedural may be applied
retroactively.

(See Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.

Ct. 68, 70 L. Ed. 216

(1925) and discussion, infra.)

This new statute procedurally alters the former law of
accomplice corroboration and thus can be so applied.
The landmark case in the area of ex post facto
laws and their general prohibition is Calder v. Bull, supra.
There the United States Supreme Court outlined four catagories
of laws which must be regarded as ex post facto and, hence,
void in application:
I will state what laws I consider
ex post facto laws, within the ·,;ords
and intent of the prohibition.
1st.
Every la\v that makes an action done
before the passing of the law, and
which was innocent when done, criminal;
and punishes such action.
2d. Every
law that aggravates a crime, or makes
it greater than it was, when committed.
3d. Everv law that chances the punishment and-inflicts a gre~ter punishment,
than the law annexed to the crime, when
committed.
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4th. Every law that alters the legal
rules of evidence, and receives less,
or different testimony, than the law
required at the time of the commission
of the offence [sic), in order to convict the offender.
3 Dall.

(U.S.) at 390.

(Emphasis in original.)

The first

three categories are not applicable here; the fourth one
is.

The Calder Court itself recognized, however, that

"[e) very ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective;
but every restropective law is not an ex post facto law:
the former only are prohibited." Id., at 390.
in original.)

(Emphasis

Therfore, in this most important landmark

case, exceptions to the general rule are alluded to.
The fourth category of Calder's list has been
eroded and interpreted more than the other three, especially
as to Calder's statement that only ex post facto retrospective
laws are prohibited.

In 16 Am. Jur. 2d 735, Constitutional

Law § 396, the following observation is made:
Doubts have been entertained, however,
by some of the courts and authorities
as to whether the fourth class does
not include cases outside the prohibition and whether every law that alters
the legal rules of evidence and receives
different testimony from that which the
law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to
convict the offender, is an ex post
facto lav;.
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I

See Moore v. State, 43 NJL 203 (1881); Beazell v. Ohio,
supra; Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 u.s. 589, 21 s.ct.
730, 45 L. Ed. 1015 (1901); King v. Missouri, 107

u.s.

221, 2 S.Ct.443, 27 L. Ed. 506 (1882); and Hopt v. Utah,
llO U.S.

574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L. Ed. 262 (1894).
In Beazell v. Ohio, supra, this exception and

modification of Calder's fourth category is clearly outlined.

The statute in question in Beazell affected "only

the manner in which the trial of those jointly accused
shall be conducted."

Id., at 170.

The United States

Supreme Court ruled:
Expressions are to be found in
earlier judicial opinions to the effect
that the constitutional limitation may
be transgressed by alterations in the
rules of evidence or procedure [citations omitted]. And there may be
procedural changes which operate to
deny to the accused a defense available
under the laws in force at the time
of the commission of his offense, or
which otherwise affect him in such a
harsh and arbitrary manner as to fall
within the constitutional prohibition
[citations omitted].
But it is now
well settled that statutory changes
in the mode of trial or the rules of
evidence, which do not deprive the
accused of a defense and which operate
only in a limited and unsubstantial
manner to his disadvantage, are not
prohibited. A statute which, after
indictment, enlar0es the class of
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persons who may be witnesses at the
trial, by removing the disqualification
of persons convicted of felony, is not
an ex post facto law. [Citation omitted]
nor is a statute which changes the
rules of evidence after the indictment
so as to render admissible against the
accused evidence previously held inadmissible, [citation omitted] or which
changes the place of trial, [citation
omitted] or which abolishes a court
for hearing criminal appeals, creating
a new one in its stead. [citation omitted].
269

u.s.

at 170-171.

(Emphasis added.)

Thus, where the statutory changes only have a
limited and unsubstantial effect to the accused, there
such statute, while ex post facto in application, is not
prohibited as a retrospective law.

Furthermore, the Beazell

Court stressed that the prohibition of retrospective laws
generally applied to statutes:
. . . which purport to make innocent
acts criminal after the event, or to
aggravate an offense, are harsh and
oppressive, and that the criminal
quality attributable to an act, either
by the legal definition of the offense
or by the riature or amount of the
punishment imposed for its commission,
should not be altered by legislative
enactment, after the fact, to the
disadvantage of the accused.
269 U.S. at 170.

Such harsh consequences are not present

in the instant matter.

The act the appellant committed
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herein was just as criminal before the new accomplice
statute was passed as after.

Respondent submits that

the long history of the repugnancy of ex post facto
retrospective laws lies in the general prohibition of
laws which make criminal an act which was innocent when
committed and the imposition of a greater penalty on an
offense than was present when committed.

In other words,

the first three Calder categories must be interpreted
strictly to protect the innocent or less culpable; yet,
the fourth category must be construed more liberally so
as to allow the courts flexibility in applying newly
enacted procedural legislation where the accused's
fundamental rights are not threatened by such new laws.
Appellant and amicus argue that the change in
the law at issue here was a substantive change because
under the new law the "quantum and kind of proof necessary
to establish guilt" has been altered to appellant's
disadvantage.

(See Beazell v. Ohio, supra, and Amicus

brief , at p.9.)

However, a close reading of Beazell,

and Hopt v. Utah, supra, --which appellant and amicus
rely upon--does not hold so narrowly.
Beazell, as above quoted, clearly holds that the
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I

prohibition of retrospective statutes does not apply to
laws "which do not deprive the accused of a defense and
which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner."
Id., at 170.

Only those after-the-fact statutes which

work a serious disadvantage against an accused are proscribed,
Hopt, supra, also supports this view.

There

the United States Supreme Court distinguished ex post laws
which "deprive the accused of a substantial right" with
a second category of laws that:
do not attach criminality
to any act previously done and which
was innocent when done; nor aggravate
any crime theretofore committed; nor
provide a greater punishment therefor
than was prescribed at the time of
its commission; nor do they alter the
degree, or lessen the amount or measure,
of the proof which was made necessary
to conviction when the crime was
committed. . .
Any statutory alteration of the
legal rules of evidence which would
authorize conviction upon less proof,
in amount or degree, than was required
when the offence [sic] was committed,
might, in respect of that offence [sic]
be obnoxious to the constitutional
inhibition upon ex post facto laws.
110 U.S. at 589-590.

(Emphasis added.)

Therefore, this second category of laws may be
applied retroactively.

Respondent admits that while Hopt

holds certain legislative changes in the rules of evidence
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"might . . . be obnoxious to the constitutional inhibition"
prohibiting retrospective ex post facto laws, Hopt recognizes that the reverse is also true.

That is, the ex post

facto prohibition has no application to changes which
relate to various modes of procedure.
Numerous cases support the view that procedural
changes are not proscribed by the ex post facto rule:
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 18 S.Ct. 620, 42 L. Ed.
1061 (1898), rules of criminal procedure; Thompson v.
Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898),
changes in admissibility of circumstantial evidence permitted;
Ashe v. United States, 270 U.S. 424, 46 S.Ct. 333, 70 L.
Ed. 662 (1926), granting or

witholding of peremptory

challenges; Marion v. State, 20 Neb. 233, 29 N.W. 911 (1886),
allowing jury rather than court to fix punishment and
determining that court rather than jury will be judge of
the law; People v. campbell, 59 Cal. 243,

(1881), change

from indictment to information; State v. Kavanaugh, 32 N.M.
~04,

258 P. 209

(1927), change in the number of grand jurors;

t.=ope Mutual Insurance Co.

v. Flynn, 38 Mo. 483,

and State v. Barrett, 138 N.C. 630, 50 S.E. 506
al~er

(1866)
(1905),

the force to be given to designated facts in determining

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
-3:3-OCR, may contain errors.

whether certain presumptions should arise; Beazell v. Ohio,
supra, changes in mode of presenting questions and proof
of the· relative credibility of evidence; State v. Morton,
338

s.w.

2d 858,

(Mo., 1960), judge may hear evidence of

prior convictions out of jury's presence; People v.

Edenbu~,

88 Cal. App. 558, 263 P. 857 (1928), court may make
initial examination of veniremen; People v. Gibson, 39
Cal. App. 202, 178 P.338

(1919), qualifications for jury

service; Beazell v. Ohio, supra, joint trial of offenders;
People v. Qualey, 210 N.Y. 202, 104 N.E. 138 (1914),
entering deposition of deceased witness was no violation
of right to "face-to-face" confrontation of accusers or
witnesses; State v. Clevenger, 69 Wash. 2d 136, 417 P.2d
626 (1966), abandonment of prohibition on inter-spousal
testimony allowed even though prospective; State v. Pope,
73 Wash. 2d 919, 442 P.2d 994

(1968), changes in restriction:

on competency of certain classes of witnesses; and Splawn
v. California, 431 U.S. 595, 97 S.Ct. 1987, 52 L. Ed. 2d
606 (1977), alteration in jury instruction statute was
constitutionally sound even though passed after defendant's
criminal offense.
A most recent United States Supreme Court case
further clarifies under what circumstances ex post facto
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statutes may be retroactively applied.

In Dobbert v.

Florida, 432 u.s. 282, 97 s.ct. 2290, 53 L. Ed. 344 (1977),
a first degree murder conviction was challenged and the Court
was faced with deciding if the changes in Florida's death
penalty statute between the time of the murder and the
time of trial were "procedural and on the whole ameliorative,
and hence .
at 283.

.

[not an] ex post facto violation."

Id.,

The court held that it is a well-settled priniciple

of law:
. . . that "[t]he inhibition upon
the passage of ex post facto laws
does not give a-criiDinar-a:right
to be tried, in all respects, by
the law in force when the crime
charged was committed." [citation
omitted].
"[T]he constitutional
provision was intended to secure
substantial personal rights against
arbitrary and oppressive legislation,
[citation omitted], and not to ·
limit the legislative control of
remedies and modes of procedure
which do not affect matters of
substance." [citation omitted].
Even though it may work to
the disadv~ntage of a defendant,
a procedural change is not ex
post facto.

*

*

*

In the case at hand, the change
in the statute was clearly procedural.
The new statute simply altered the
methods employed in determining
whether the death penalty was to be
imposed; there was no change in the
quantum of punishment attached to
the crime. The following language
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from [Hopt v. Utah, supra,] applicable
with equal force to the case at hand,
summarizes our conclusion that the
change was procedural and not a violation
of the Ex Post Facto Clause:
-- "The crime for which the
present defendant was indicted,
the punishment prescribed therefor, and the quantity or the
degree of proof necessary to
establish his guilt, all remained unaffected by the subsequent statute." 110 U.S.,
at 589-590, 4 s.ct., at 210.
In this case, not only was the
change in the law procedural, it was
ameliorative.
It is axiomatic that
for a law to be ex post facto it
must be more onerous than the prior
law.
Petitioner argues that the change
in the law harmed him because the
jury's recommendation of life imprisonment would not have been subject
to review by the trial judge under
the prior law.
But it certainly
cannot be said with assurance that,
had his trial been conducted under
the old statute, the jury would have
returned a verdict of life.
432 U.S. at 293-294

(Emphasis added.)

It should be empha-

sized here that the Supreme Court in Dobbert rejected the
"work-to-the-disadvantage-of-a-defendant" test as the
measure in determining whether an ex post facto law will
be prohibited or allowed.

Rather, the Dobbert test seems

to be that a reviewing court must only determine whether
the new law alters substantive or procedural rights of
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the accused.

If found to be the former, then the law may

not be retroactively applied; if found to be the latter,
then it may.

Also, the Dobbert test examines whether the

new law is more onerous than the former and prohibits or
allows the law's application accordingly.
It is also crucial that Dobbert re-asserts the
ex post facto rule of Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565,
16 s.ct. 904, 40 L.Ed. 1075 (1896) that an accused has no
vested right "to be tried, in all respects, by the law in
force w.hen the crime charged was committed."

Id., at 590.

In accord, Thompson v. Missouri, supra; Van Voorhis v. D.C.,
236 F. Supp. 978

(D.D.C. 1965); Adelman ·v. Adelman, 58 Misc.

2d 803, 296 N.Y.S. 2d 999

(1969); Merchants Despatch Transp.

Co. v. Arizona State Tax Cornrn., 20 Ariz. App. 276, 512 P.2d
39 (1973); Oklahoma Water Res. Bd. v. Central Oklahoma
Master Con. Dist., 464 P.2d 748

(Okla. 1969); Allen v. Fisher,

118 Ariz. 95, 574 P.2d 1314 (1977); In ReMarriage of Bouquet,
128 Cal. Rptr. 427,546 P.2d 1371 (1976); and State v.
Malone, 9 Wash. App. 122, 511 P.2d 67 (1973).
Respondent contends that the principles outlined
i". Dobbert are dispositive of the present case:

(1) appellant

cannot expect all la\vS and procedural rights in force at
~~e

time of the offense to be unchanged and effective at

t~e

trial;

(2)

while an additional hardship may fall on
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appellant because of the change, such burden does not per
se make the law void as per the ex post facto clause; and
(3) the crime, the punishment and the elements needed tc
be proven have all remained unchanged throughout the
course of this matter.

(In regards to this last point,

see State v. Coleman, 540 P.2d 953 (Utah 1975); Paul v.
State, 483 P.2d 1176 (Okla., 1971): Johnson v. Morris,
87 Wash. 2d 922, 557 P.2d 1299 (1976); and State v. Jones,
214 Kan. 568, 521 P.2d 278 (1974)). All of these principles
are applicable herein and respondent urges the court to
rule that the new

§

77-31-18 Utah Code Ann.

(1979) is

a procedural alteration of the accomplice statute and may
be validly applied retroactively.
Finally, respondent recognizes that a similar
case has been decided by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Amicus cites the case of Government of Virgin Islands v.
Civil, 591 F.2d 255 (CA 3, 1979) in which the repeal of
the Virgin Islands' corroboration of accomplice statute
was held to substantially affect the defendant and therefou
the trial court could not retroactively apply the statute's
repeal.
This however is not the case here.
accomplice statute,

§

77-31-18 Utah Code Ann.

The Utah
(1953) as
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amended, was replaced with the new statute.
for the quoted laws.)

(See

~

Recognizing the need to qualify the

new statute, the Legislature included a second subsection (§ 77-31-18(2)

(1979)), which makes adequate provision for the

trial judge to caution jury members of the possible
improbable, uncertain or contradictory nature of an
accomplice's testimony.

The Virgin Islands statute, on

the other hand, was repealed and no new statute nor qualifying
modification was put in its place.

Thus, the ex post facto

principles above discussed regarding changes in statutes or
altering procedural modes of trial, etc. are inapplicable to
the Civil case.

Clearly, where a change in the law is as

drastic as Civil, the ex post facto prohibition is justified.
No such drastic action is present in the instant case.
In conclusion, respondent urges that each ex
post facto law must be carefully scrutinized on a case-bycase basis in order to determine whether the law should be
proscribed or allowed.

In the words of Justice Stone in

Beazell v. Ohio, supra:
Just ~hat alterations of procedure
be held to be of sufficient moment
to transgress the constitutional prohibition cannot be embraced within a formula
or stated in a general proposition.
The
distinction is one of degree.
But the
constitutional provision was intended to
secure substantial personal rights against

~ill
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arbitrary and oppressive legislation,
[citation omitted], and not to limit
the legislative control of remedies
and modes of procedure which do not
affect matters of substance. [citations
omitted.]
269 U.S. at 170.

(Emphasis added.)

This same view was well-stated in Hochman,
"The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation," 73 Harvard Law Review 692

(1960):

[W]hen one considers the great variety of cases, it becomes clear that
no one factor is sufficient to explain
the results which the Court has reached.
Rather it is submitted that the constitutionality of such a statute is
determined by three major factors,
each of which must be weighed in any
particular case.
These factors are:
the nature and strength of the public
interest served by the statute, the
extent to which the statute modifies
or abrogates the asserted preenactment
right, and the nature of the right
which the statute alters. Since the
great variety of cases in this field
do not lend themselves to sweeping
generalizations, it seems inappropriate
to attempt to develop an ideal scheme
for the Court to follow in cases involving retroactive statutes nor even
to offer a formula for predicting the
result in any given class of cases.
73 Harvard Law Review at 696-697.
Respondent urges that once this Court specifically considers
the public interest served by the new statute, the
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modification of appellant's rights thereunder, and the
nature of the right affected by the change that the new
accomplice statute will be deemed to alter only procedural
modes of trial and that it may therefore be 'retroactively
applied.
CONCLUSION
The trial court had sufficient evidence and
legal support to rule that Jill Hales was not appellant's
accomplice.

Thus, her testimony alone could convict

appellant.
Assuming that Jill Hales was appellant's accomplice,
there was nonetheless ample

corroborati~e

evidence offered

at trial to support Ms. Hales' testimony.
Finally, even if the trial court applied the
new accomplice statute (which respondent contends was not
applied in this case), its application would have been
proper since an analysis of the legal rules of ex post
facto priniciples shows that the law at issue only procedurally changes preexisting modes of trial.
On the basis of the above authority and the
evidence against appellant presented at trial, respondent
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prays that the verdict and sentence be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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